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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
JOHN IRA BAER, 
Plaintiff and avpellant, 
vs. 
GAIL YOUNG, 
Defendant and respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
12055 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a suit by a husband against the wife's alleged 
paramour, claiming damages for alienation of affection 
and criminal conversation. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
Decree were entered by the lower court on the 15th day 
of September 1969, rendering judgment for the plain-
tiff and against the defendant in the amount of $25,000 
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and reciting, that "defendant having failed and refused 
to appear, did not appear, and his default was entered." 
(R. 13-15) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mrs. Gail Young was served a summons and com-
plaint on the 17th day of April at her home. (R. 8) 
1The defendant, Gail Young, did not live at that 
residence with his wife, but was rather residing at the 
home of plaintiff, and resided there from January 25, 
until June 10. (R. Page 46, line 12, R. 11) 
•The defendant subsequently somehow did obtain a 
summons and complaint and had the same in his pos-
session at a hearing held before Judge Anderson on 
May 28, 1969 as evidenced by the following language 
found on page 66 of the record, lines 8-19: 
"Q. Now, immediately after the hearing, Mr. 
Young, didn't you come up to me with a sum-
mons and complaint in this very action and 
hand it to me an say, "Look, my time is up; 
what should I do with this?" Now, did you 
or didn't you? 
A. I think this was on the one that - yes, one 
I brought in; this was your "show cause"; 
right. 
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Q. But you had a summons and complaint in 
this action, did you not, and you said, "My 
time is up now, what should I do" Isn't that 
correct - right in the courtroom? 
THE COURT: Judge Anderson's courtroom? 
Q. Judge Anderson's courtroom; do you recall 
that? 
A. I think so, yes. 
All other facts stated by the plaintiff-appellant are 
immaterial to this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
SERVICE UPON THE DEFENDANT - RESPONDENT'S 
ESTRANGED WIFE AT A HOME WHERE THE DEFEND-
ANT WAS NOT RESIDING, DID NOT CONSTITUTE GOOD 
SERVICE UPON THE DEFENDANT UNDER APPLICABLE 
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCED-
URE. 
Plaintiff-appellant has misquoted Rule 4( e) (1) in his 
brief, and that Rule is correctly quoted as follows: 
" ( e) Personal Service in this State. Personal 
service within the State shall be as follows: 
(1) Upon a natural person of the age 
of 14 years or over, by delivering a copy 
thereof to him personally, or by leaving such 
copy at his usual place of abode with some 
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person of suitable age and discretion there 
residing; or by delivering a copy to an agent 
authorized by appointment or by law to re-
ceive service of process." 
The primary issue in this case is ·whether or not 
the service of process was made at the usual place of 
abode of the defendant. 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, it is very 
clear that the defendant was not a the time living at tlw 
address where the service of smmnons was made, and 
had not befm living then• for over two months. 
A fundamental distinction has been made in this 
State between the notion of residence and usual place 
of abode, the latter term being defined as the place at 
which one is actually living. This distinction was made 
by Justice Wolfe in Booth v. Crockett, 110 Utah 363, 
173 P.2d 647 (Utah 1946). The following language is 
extensively quoted from that case, because of its rele-
vance and applicability: 
"The recent cases of Kurilla v. Roth, August, 
1944, 132 N.J .L. 213, 38 A.2d 862, 8G-!, and McFad-
den v. Shore, D.C., .March 19-!5 GO F.Supp. 8, 9, 
involved fact situations indistinguishable in legal 
effect from the original case here. 
The New Jersey court in the Kurilla ca~e 
said in part: 
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"'Abode' is one's fixed place of residence 
for the time being - the place where a person 
dwells. One's 'usual place of abode,' in the statu-
tory view, is the place where one is 'actually liv-
ing' at the time when service is made." 
"Of course, a person may enter one of the 
armed services under conditions that permit him 
to retain his preexisting place of abode within 
the meaning of this Act; but such is not the case 
here. Upon defendant's induction into the armed 
forces, his mother's home ceased instanter to be 
his place of abode. It does not matter in this 
regard that some of his clothing and personal 
belongings remain there, or that he intends to 
return to his mother's home, wherever it may he, 
as soon as his military SE~rvice is terminated. 
\Vhile filial love binds him to his mother wherever 
she may be, and her home is his for lack of 
another, it is no longer his 'actual place of abode' 
within the intendment of the statuh•." 
The New Jersey court ordered the service 
quashed. 
McFadden v. Shore, supra, was decided by 
a Federal District Court in Pennsylvania. The 
court held the defendant's "usual residence" was 
his usual place of abode' and held substituted 
service made by leaving the copy of the summons 
at the home of the sailor defendants parents. 
This court in Grant v. Lawrence, 37 Utah 
450, 108 P. 931, 933, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 280, in-
terpreted the phrase "usual place of abode" and 
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gave it the restricted meaning given by the New 
Jersey court in the l(urilla case. In the Lawrence 
case this court said: 
"Usual place of ah ode is sometimes ref erred 
to as being synonymous withd omicile or perma-
nent residence. In our judgment there is a broad 
distinction between domicile and usual plaee of 
abode as the latter term is used in our statute. 
Such also sel'UlS to be the conclusion reached b>-
the authorities, as is demonstrated b>- the follmr-
ing cases: In Mygatt v. Coe, G3 N.J. L 510, 51~, 
44 A. 198, 199, the Supreme Court of N e\Y Jersey, 
in construing a statute authorizing substituted 
serviee in terms similar to ours says: 
" 'The Statute do<>s not din_•ct servict' to lJe 
made, at the "residence" of the defendant, hut 
at his dwelling house or usual plaee of abode, 
which is a much more restricted term. As was 
said in Stout v. Leonard, 37 N.J.L. 492, many 
persons have several residences which they per-
manently maintain, occupying one at one pt>riod 
of the year and one at another period. vVhere 
such conditions exist, a summons must be serv("d 
at the dwelling house in which the defendant is 
living at the time when service is made.'" 
The court \Yt>nt on to say: 
"After departing for naval s0rvice, Frank';.; 
ordinary activities of living wen• no longPr een-
tered around the Fairbanks home. He no longer 
usually ate or slept there. He was no longer 
usually physically prc>st>nt at the home or shortly 
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expected. His duties required him to be at his 
station, which at the time the copy of the sum-
mons was left at the hame, was at a navy hase 
in another state. 'rhe facts that many of his 1wr-
sonal possessions rc>maint>d at the home and that 
the ties of blood and affection continued and that 
he frequently corresponded with versom; at the 
home are to be considered in determining where 
he was "living," but in this case those facts are 
greatly outweighed by his physical departure from 
the place for the purpose of undertaking naval 
duty at a distant base for apparf>ntly an irnlef-
inite period. \Ve think it clear that Frank Fair-
banks was not "living" at the Fairbanks home 
when the copy of tJu:. smmnom; was lPft then'. 
vV e do not nwan that \Yhen a person fh•1iarts 
from his usual place of abodP h'rnporarily for 
lms1ness, pleasure or cultural purpost>s lw has 
ceased living at his usual place of abode. Living-
at a place does not 11wan that a iwrson must lw 
always there. But if the hrPak in the continuity 
of his acivities which constitute living a wlwt 
was his home is so marked, such as an indefinited 
tenure of military or any duty away from that 
home or a departure for a prolonged though def-
inite term of study or where he has distinctly 
taken up a new station for business purpos0s, 
even though he may have his helongings at his 
former place of abode or keep in close co1Tespon-
dential touch with it, tlH~ place where he lived 
would be not his present usual place of abode, but 
a former place of abode. Such a marked sever-
ance with the place at whirh he abided me:.rns that 
he no longer usually abides there." ... 
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"From the facts and circumstances of this 
case, we hold the Fairbanks home was not Frank 
Fairbanks' "usual place of abode" on December 
13, 1945, and that therefore, Judge Crockett ruled 
correctly in granting the motion to quash service 
in the original case.'' 
The court, in the foregoing case also found that the 
fact that the defendant has actually been adivsed of 
the suit and had actually received notice of the summons 
from his parents did not change the fact that the initial 
attempted service was void. 
Grant v. Lawrence, 37 Utah 450, 108 Pac. 931, stated 
as follows: 
"The statute does not direct service to he 
made at the 'residence' of the defendant, but at 
his dwelling house or usual place of abode, which 
is a much more restricted term. As was said in 
Stout v. Leonard, 37 N.J. Law, 492, many persons 
have several residences which they permanently 
maintain, occupying one at one period of the year 
and another at another period. Where such con-
ditions exist, a summons must be served at the 
dwelling house in which the defendant is libing-
at the time when the service is made." That is, 
where a person abides - lives - at the particular 
time when the summons is served, constitutPs his 
usual place of abode." 
We see therefore that the courts in construing the 
question have vt>ry narrowly limited the application of 
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the statute in order to give the defendant an opportunity 
to be heard in court. 
POINT TWO 
THE APPEARANCE OF THE DEFENDANT BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE ALDON J. ANDERSON DID NOT CON-
STITUTE A GENERAL APPEARANCE IN THE ACTION 
WHICH SUBJECTED HIM TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF RENDERING PERSONAL 
JUDGMENT AGAINST HIM. 
The defendant appeared pursuant to the order of 
thP court that he appear, of which order he received 
actual notice. 
The defendant Gail Young howevt>r should not be 
pPnalized for appearing voluntarily for the hearing on 
the isue as to whether or not he should be required to 
remove himself from the home of Kayla Baer. 
The only issue resolved at that hearing was the 
question of his removal, and he was ordered by the court 
to so remove himeslf, and complied with that order. 
As was stated under point one in the quotation from 
the case of Booth v. Crockett, the fact that the defendant 
may have actually received the complaint does not make 
valid an initially void service. 
The case of Sorensen v. Sorensrn, 18 Utah 2nd 102, 
417 Pacific 2nd 118, cited by appellant, is clearly not 
in point, for in that case the party who contended that 
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there . was no justification m the court had answered 
and filed a counterclaim. 
"So: Mother says the lower court had no 
jurisdiction because father didn't serve her with 
summons within the time prescribed by Rule 4(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Up until this 
time service seems to have been satisfactory. 
She would be correct under the rule except 
she counter-claimed, sought relief, got part of 
that for which she asked, and now complains that 
with all this she should receive the benefits of 
the lower court's decision but not the bitter fruits 
thereof ... " 
The defendant in this case has not requested any 
relief of the court prior to his motion to set aside the 
judgment for the reason of lack of jurisdiction over his 
person. 
The mere physical presence of a party or his attor-
ney in the court room during some phase of the proceed-
ing does not constitute the entry of an appearance. 
5 American Jurisprudence 2d, Appearance, Section 17, 
page 493, also see Smith v. Gadd (Ky) 280 SW2d 495; 
Fulton v. Ramsey, 67 W. Va. 321, 68 SE 381; Honeycutt 
v. Nyquist, P. & Co., 12 vVyo. 183, 74 P. 90. 
The relief sought in the order to show cause was 
similar to or would have resulted in a contempt proceed-
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ing. In that regard, see 5 American Jurisprudence 2d, 
Section 33, at page 507, which states as follows: 
"Similarily, an appearance in response to a 
contempt rule, and the actual purging of the con-
tempt by compliance with the order of the court, 
does no constitue an appearance in the action 
in which the order was entered.'' 
The lower court did not make a finding that Judge 
Anderson's hearing constituted a general appearance on 
behalf of the defendant at the time of the default, nor 
was any evidence offered in that regard at the default 
hearing but rather, jurisdiction over the default was 
found based upon the service of the summons upon the 
defendant's wife. (R. 12-14) 'The decree specifically pro-
vides defendant "did not appear." (R. 12) 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING ITS DE-
CISION AFTER THE DEFENDANT'S APPEAL HAD BEEN 
DISMISSED FROM THE SUPREME COURT. 
The appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on 
the 26th day of February, 1970. (R. 31) The order 
setting aside the judgment was entered March 23, 1970. 
(R. 36) Therefore, the lower court clearly had jurisdic-
tion to enter the judgment when it did based upon the 
record before that. 
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POINT FOUR 
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS IMPROPERLY IN-
CLUDED MATTERS IN ITS BRIEF WHICH ARE NOT RE-
FLECTED BY THE RECORD. 
The plaintiff-appellant states m his conclusion as 
follows: 
"Defendant readily admits that all allega-
tions of the Complaint are true. He has further 
intentionally failed to answer and, in open Court 
acknowledged that Findings of Fact, and Conclu-
sions of Law are accurate." 
It is improper for the defendant-appellant to include 
such an allegation in his brief, for nowhere in the record 
does the defendant readily admit that all allegations 
of the complaint are true. Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 
2d 406, 385 Pac. 2d 154. 
1CONCLUSION 
The presumptions which rest in favor of affirming 
the lower court and in favor of allowing the defendant-
respondent to have his case tried upon the merits and 
the obvious inequities appearing from the records should 
in view of the law lead the court to conclude that the 
service was void, that the defndant did not make a 
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general appearance, submitting himself to jurisdiction, 
and that the lowPr court was not precluded from hear-
ing the motion to S(~t aside the judgment. 
Respectfull~r submitted, 
SUMMERHAYS, KLINGLE 
& COHNE 
By: Lowell V. Summerhays 
Attorney for the Dr,fendant-
Respondent 
1010 University Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 364-7737 
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